Introduction
A policy with risky outcomes can be modelled as a (risky) prospect. A prospect is a matrix of utilities. On the rows we list the people who are affected by the policy. In the columns we list alternative states of the world and we specify a probability distribution over the states. Each person faces a personal prospect on a policy, which is a row in the matrix.
A Policy Analyst (PA) may be sensitive to different types of distributional concerns in ranking prospects. To engage our intuitions I will present some examples from food safety. When we are considering regulation of raw food items (say, milk or eggs) it is important to note the distribution of risks in the unregulated prospect. Sometimes the risks are correlated: There is a small chance of an outbreak with mass casualties, but there is a good chance that there will be no public health problem. Sometimes there is much less of a (positive) correlation: There is a good chance that there will be isolated casualties, though only a small chance of an outbreak. Sometimes the risks are focused on, say, the elderly: We expect there to be casualties among the elderly, but others won't be affected.
Such distributional features of prospects play a role in deciding whether to adopt regulation and in deciding for what prospects regulation is more and less pressing. Regulation of these items is not cost-free-there are economic costs, there are health benefits of consuming the raw food, and there is just the sheer joy of tasting the raw food.
I will consider three idealised prospects which embody different risk distributions and a prospect which neutralises these risks. Utility values are chosen so that a utilitarian, following Harsanyi's aggregation theorem (1955) , is indifferent between these prospects. However, if the PA is sensitive to distributional concerns, she will have at least some strict preferences over these prospects. The following questions arise: What distributional concerns determine these preferences? How can we measure these concerns? How is the weight of these concerns determined by the interpretation of the prospect?
And how can we design a method for determining a ranking over real-life prospects?
I have named my approach "the Distribution View" in contrast to Parfit's Priority View (1997 and, as applied to risky prospects, 2012 , which also favours the poorly off, but not on distributional grounds. Fleurbaey (2010) provides an overview of the literature and defends an evaluation of prospects in terms of the expectation of equally-distributed-equivalents. Other relevant literature includes Harsanyi (1955) , Diamond (1967) , Broome (1984a Broome ( , 1984b Broome ( , 1991 , Keeney (1980) , Rabinowicz (2001) , Adler and Sanchirico (2006 ), McCarthy (2006 , 2008 , Otsuka and Voorhoeve (2009 ), Chew and Sagi (2011 ), Adler (2011 , Bovens and Fleurbaey (2012), and Otsuka (2012) .
Comparisons are beyond the scope of this paper.
Regulating Correlated Risk, Anti-Correlated and Focused Risk
In Table 1 , there are four idealised prospects, viz. three unregulated prospects for food items that represent different risk distributions and the regulated prospect. There are three persons (rows) and three equiprobable states (columns). We will assume that there are only three utility levels, viz. the levels associated with remaining healthy while consuming the unregulated but uncontaminated food item (u = 1), with death resulting from consuming the unregulated contaminated food item (u = 0), and with consuming the regulated food item while remaining healthy but incurring the costs (u = 2/3).
Utilities are measured on a ratio scale and the zero point represents the worst outcome that may actualise for the type of policy that is under consideration.
There are Correlated Risk (CR) and Focused Risk (FR) which we described in section 1. When there is no positive correlation, then risks are typically independent in the real world. However, Anti-Correlated Risk (ACR) brings out the same normative features of independent risk in our analysis and can be represented in a two-column matrix. And finally there is the case of Regulation (R). She is sensitive to the inter-personal-prospect distribution.
b) Ex post. Same as in 2b.
Note that 3a and 3b are the same. In fact, there is no ex ante route that is distinct from the ex post route since Focused Risk is in effect a certain prospect-i.e. it does not affect anyone's utility what state of the world actualises. But it is worth making this conceptual distinction if we keep in mind that Focused Risk is a stylised case of a real world in which the risk is disproportionately focused on some people and not on others. Assuming that one person is bound to die is just an idealisation. In 3a the PA is sensitive to the fact that people face unequal expectations. In 3b she is sensitive to the unequal distribution in the many states that may actualise when risks are disproportionately focused.
The PA can justify her preference for Regulation in each case by pointing to an ex ante distributional feature and by pointing to an ex post distributional feature. On the ex ante route, these distributional features are either intra-personal-prospect or inter-personal-prospect. On the ex post route, these distributional features are either intra-state or inter-state. We summarise the concerns which the PA may invoke to justify her preference in Inequality aversion can be measured by means of the same oneparameter functions yielding equally distributed equivalents. Take an allocation <Person 1: $16; Person 2: $4 : For the parameter's infimum, the equally distributed equivalent is $10, i.e. the average amount allocated (for inequality neutrality); for its supremum, it is $4, i.e. the worst amount allocated (for extreme inequality aversion); and it is a monotonically decreasing function for intermediate values.
The parameter value measures sensitivity to a distribution-ranging from non-sensitivity for (risk or inequality) neutrality and maximum sensitivity for extreme (risk or neutrality) aversion. We model the PA's sensitivity to the various distributional concerns by applying this function to the row utilities for the intra-personal-prospect distributional concern, to the column utilities for the intra-state distributional concern, to the expectations for the inter-personal-prospect distributional concern, and to the social utilities (i.e. the averages of the utilities in each state) for the inter-state distributional concern.
Let us show how this works for a PA who is comparing Correlated Risk and Regulation on the ex ante route with a concern for the intra-personalprospect distribution. In Correlated Risk, the value of each individual prospect is (1/3√0 + 1/3√1 + 1/3√1) 2 = 4/9. The value of the prospect is the average value of the individual prospects, i.e. 4/9. In Regulation, the value of each individual prospect is (1/3√2/3 + 1/3√2/3 + 1/3√2/3) 2 = 2/3 and so the value of the prospect is 2/3. Hence the PA prefers Regulation, which has value 2/3, to Correlated Risk, which has value 4/9.
Similar calculations show that Regulation is preferred to Correlated Risk, to Anti-Correlated Risk and to Focused Risk, each time with one ex ante and one ex post concern pointing in the same direction. The evaluation of prospects will not always be this straightforward, as we will see in the next section.
Ordering Unregulated Prospects
Suppose that there are the three unregulated prospects in Table 1 . The PA has decided that bringing in regulation for each prospect is advisable for distributional reasons, citing some of the reasons mentioned in section 2. But there is austerity and the government cannot afford regulating all prospects.
What we need is an ordering over the unregulated prospects: Which one is worse, and hence more in need of regulation, and which one is not so bad, and hence less in need of regulation? Let us turn to pairwise comparisons. We can construct similar examples as in comparisons 4 and 5 to make these tensions plausible. For example, urban cyclists who have to cross a bridge that has structural problems and may collapse under the weight of rush-hour traffic face correlated risk. Again, it is reasonable to invest in bridge safety rather than base-jumping safety.
4) Correlated Risk vs

Ex ante
Ex post CR ≻ FR inter-personal-prospect intra-state FR ≻ CR intra-personal-prospect inter-state Table 5 . Correlated Risk vs. Focused Risk
Single-Concern Prospect Assessment
We can now construct a simple model covering all prospects. The PA is only allowed to cite one distributional concern. In the problem at hand, she is concerned about (i) reducing outcome inequalities (ex post intra-state), (ii) avoiding catastrophes (ex post inter-state), (iii) reducing the risk facing individuals (ex ante intra-personal-prospect), or (iv) reducing unequal expectations (ex ante inter-personal-prospect). If she mentions an ex ante concern, we will do the requisite ex ante calculation, whereas if she mentions an ex post concern, we will do the requisite ex post calculation.
For example, suppose she says that she is concerned about reducing outcome inequalities. She is sensitive to the intra-state distribution which enters in on the ex post route. We can simply read off from tables 3, 4 and 5 that CR ≻ ACR ~ FR. In table 2, we note that the intra-state distribution sensitivity does not favour CR over R and hence the ranking R ~ CR holds.
An ex post calculation, as laid out in section 3, with sensitivity to the intra-state distribution yields precisely the same ordering. Other cases are listed in Table 6 . Table 6 . Ranking of prospects for single-concern PAs
The basic model for the assessment of prospects on the Distribution
View is now in place. We can now add various layers of complexity so as to move closer to real-world prospect assessment.
Towards Real-World Prospect Assessment
In the real world, the PA will be facing prospects affecting multiple people and with many not necessarily equiprobable states. This poses no problem. If we have matrices of utilities measured on a ratio scale and we have recorded the type of distributional concerns that the PA brings to bear to the problem at hand, then we calculate the value of each prospect.
We can also give up on the binary framework and permit the PA to register different levels of distributional sensitivities. So far we have assumed So far our PA was only allowed to register a single concern. We can also model a PA who registers multiple distributional concerns.
She may wish to apply these concerns in a lexical fashion. For example, suppose that she says that it is of foremost importance to her to reduce individual risk and, if there is a tie, then she wishes to avoid catastrophes.
Look at Table 6 : By sensitivity to the Intra-Personal-Prospect Distribution, R ~ FR ≻ ACR ~ CR and by sensitivity to the Inter-State Distribution, we break the tie: R ~ FR ≻ ACR ≻ CR.
Alternatively, she may wish to give these concerns different weights. Now suppose that she assesses the prospects on the ex ante route and registers ex ante distributional sensitivities of different strengths. For example, she may set her sensitivity to the intra-personal-prospect distribution at γ = 1/2 and the sensitivity to the inter-personal-prospect distribution at γ = 2/3. Then the value of each personal prospect is the square of the average of the utilities' square roots and the value of the prospect is the cube of the average of individual-prospect values' cubic roots.
Let us see how this plays out using our calculus. We first calculate the value of each personal prospect following ( To get an intuitive feel for this result, return to Table 6 We can now specify a general method for evaluating prospects which can work with any distributional sensitivity the PA may hold. Rather than adding more formalism, we will do so in a discursive manner.
(a) To determine the value of a prospect, we specify its ex ante value and its ex post value.
(b) To determine the ex ante value, we first calculate the value of each personal prospect by applying the function f to the row utilities with a value for the parameter γ that expresses the PA's sensitivity to the intra-personal-prospect distribution. We then calculate the ex ante value of the prospect, by applying f to the values of the personal prospects with a value for γ that expresses the PA's sensitivity to the inter-personal-prospect distribution.
(c) To determine the ex post value, we first calculate the value of each state by applying f to the column utilities with a value for γ that expresses the PA's sensitivity to the intra-state distribution. We then calculate the ex post value of the prospect by applying f to the values of the states with a value for γ that expresses the PA's sensitivity to the inter-state distribution.
(d)
The value of the prospect is the weighted sum of the ex ante and the ex post values, with the weights being the relative weights of the sum of the ex ante parameters and the sum of the ex post parameters over the sum of all parameters.
(e) The PA weakly prefers one prospect over another if the value of the former weakly exceeds the value of the latter.
We can work this general method towards reflective equilibrium. We can also use the model for the purpose of constructing a normative ordering over prospects in a particular sphere of policy making. I argued above that for certain types of policies certain distributional sensitivities may be more or less fitting. Spelling out sphere-specific norms for relative sensitivities will provide guidance in policy ranking. 1
